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I. INTRODUCTION
What should we teach to our students and how should we teach it to
them? In particular, how can law schools best prepare students for their legal
careers? Answers to these basic pedagogical questions continue to elude us.
Within the current legal community there is no general consensus regarding
how best to teach our students the law or how to meet the future challenges of
legal education. The lack of consensus is not from want of trying.1 There does
Assistant Professor; Capital University Law School; L.L.M. Columbia Law School; J.D.
Vanderbilt University Law School; M.A. (Philosophy) Tulane University. I wish to thank Julia
Spring and Peter Strauss for their insightful suggestions and comments on an earlier draft of this
essay. I also thank my colleagues Susan Gilles and Mark Strasser for greatly improving the cur-
rent draft, and Capital University Law School for financial support in writing this essay. Any
errors that remain are, of course, my own.
Perhaps the most ambitious recent attempt to build a general consensus of what content and
which skills should be taught in law schools is the American Bar Association's MacCrate Report.
See Legal Education and Professional Development - An Educational Continuum, Report of the
Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap, 1992 A.B.A. SEC. LEGAL.
EDUC. ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR 137 [hereinafter the MacCrate Report]. Unfortunately, the Mac-
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appear to be, however, near uniform condemnation in modem legal scholarship
of what has been tried in the past. More specifically, teaching the law using the
Socratic method, the traditional core of legal pedagogy, is now held in general
disrepute. 2 Why is this so?
Most critics of Socratic teaching answer that the method, as currently
practiced, inevitably humiliates, intimidates, and silences students.3 In one form
or another, critics claim that the Socratic method manipulates students to expose
them to public refutation while the professor safely chooses whether or not to
reveal the correct answer or to join in the classroom discussion.4 Additionally,
the argument goes, Socratic teaching uniquely reinforces majoritarian (read
"white") and "male"-dominated thinking. The method is combative, similar to
military indoctrination or custodial interrogation, and it only serves to confuse,
entrap, and silence students - female and non-white students in particular.5 In-
Crate Report does not directly address how best to teach our students those skills, and its long list
of skills has not achieved general acceptance. See, e.g., John J. Costonis, The MacCrate Report:
Of Loaves, Fishes, and the Future of American Legal Education, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 157 (1993);
Jonathan Rose, The MacCrate Report's Restatement of Legal Education: The Need for Reflection
and Horse Sense, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 548 (1994).
2 One notable recent exception to the general disdain in current literature for Socratic teach-
ing is Jennifer L. Rosato's article entitled The Socratic Method and Women Law Students: Hu-
manize, Don't Feminize, 7 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 37 (1997).
3 See, e.g., Marina Angel, Women in Legal Education: What It's Like to Be Part of a Perpet-
ual First Wave or the Case of the Disappearing Women, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 799, 810 (1988);
Phyllis W. Beck & David Bums, Anxiety and Depression in Law Students: Cognitive Intervention,
30 J. LEGAL EDUC. 270, 285 (1979); Orin S. Kerr, The Decline of the Socratic Method at Harvard,
78 NEB. L. REV. 113, 118 (1999); Russell L. Weaver, Langdell's Legacy: Living with the Case
Method, 36 VILL. L. REV. 517, 519 (1991).
4 This is the widespread criticism of Socratic teaching that the method requires teachers "hide
the ball" unnecessarily and unfairly from students. See, e.g., THOMAS SHAFFER & ROBERT
REDMOUNT, LAWYERS, LAW STUDENTS AND PEOPLE 154 (1977); Phillip E. Areeda, The Socratic
Method (SM) (Lecture at Puget Sound 1/31/90), 109 HARV. L. REV. 911, 914 (1996); Lila A.
Coleburn & Julia C. Spring, Socrates Unbound: Developmental Perspectives on the Law School
Experience, 24 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 5, 26 (2000); Weaver, supra note 3, at 519 n.5.
5 See, e.g., DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF HIERARCHY: A
POLEMIC AGAINST THE SYSTEM 61-64 (1983); ABA Comm. on Women in the Profession, Elusive
Equality: The Experiences of Women in Legal Education (1996) [hereinafter ABA Study]; Joan M.
Krauskopf, Touching the Elephant: Perceptions of Gender Issues in Nine Law Schools, 44 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 311, 314 (1994) [hereinafter Ohio Study]; Deborah L. Rhode, Missing Questions:
Feminist Perspectives on Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1547, 1554-56 (1993). Several indi-
vidual law school studies and several feminist legal scholars attribute the silencing of women in
the classroom to Socratic teaching. See, e.g., Lani Guinier et al., Becoming Gentlemen: Women's
Experiences at One Ivy League Law School, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 64-65 (1994) [hereinafter
Pennsylvania Study]; Suzanne Homer & Lois Schwartz, Admitted but Not Accepted: Outsiders
Take an Inside Look at Law School, 5 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 29 (1989-90) [hereinafter
Berkeley Study]; Jenny Morgan, The Socratic Method: Silencing Cooperation, 1 LEGAL EDUC.
REV. 151, 158-60 (1989); Rita Sethi, Speaking Up! Speaking Out! The Power of Student Speech in
Law School Classrooms, 16 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 61, 61-64 (1994); Catherine Weiss & Louise
Melling, The Legal Education of Twenty Women, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1299, 1337-38 (1988) [herein-
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deed, some critics go so far as to claim that Socratic teaching requires students
to separate their ethical and personal lives from the sterile, amoral intellectual
commitments demanded of them in law school.6
No doubt these criticisms have some merit against a type of law teach-
ing that claims to be Socratic. Possibly driven by their law school experiences
of particular overbearing law professors claiming to use the Socratic method
(read the Professor Kingsfields of the academy), critics are rightly concerned
that such a teacher effectively destroys the possibility of learning for many stu-
dents.7 The question remains, however, whether such demagoguery can accu-
rately claim to be using the Socratic method. If so, then the critics of Socratic
teaching have won the day and those of us who are committed to the method
must reconsider our choice. One of the tasks of this essay is to demonstrate that
such classroom despotism is not required of the Socratic teacher and, in fact, is
not consistent with Socratic teaching. There is another type of law teaching, one
which follows more closely the educational theory developed by Socrates and
can truly claim the name Socratic teaching.
In order to make my case, it will be necessary to take a brief look at
what Socrates actually had to say about education, an inquiry often overlooked
in the literature, and to see what the normative pedagogical commitments of that
theory actually require from the teacher.8 Accordingly, Part II of this essay is
primarily a cautionary tale for those of us who claim to use Socratic teaching. It
attempts to establish the internal pedagogical constraints of Socratic teaching so
as to guide the Socratic law teacher in the proper application of the method.
Part III of the essay will address whether the criticisms prevalent in the literature
also apply to the Socratic educational method developed in Part II. Hopefully,
this discussion will demonstrate that most of the criticisms of current Socratic
teaching do not apply to Socrates' educational theory. But the analysis will also
demonstrate that using the Socratic method properly is a difficult task, which is
often more an aspirational goal than a factual accomplishment. Likewise, Part
III will demonstrate that the scholarly criticisms of current Socratic teaching can
after Yale Study]; Coleburn & Spring, supra note 4, at 27.
6 See, e.g., SHAFFER & REDMOUNT, supra note 4, at 156; Colebum & Spring, supra note 4, at
27.
7 Notably, Professor Areeda gives the fictional Professor Kingsfield's teaching method a B
minus. See Areeda, supra note 4, at 914. This should lead us to wonder why is Professor
Areeda's grade so low? Professor Rosato correctly terms Kingsfield's approach a "mutant form"
of the Socratic method. See Rosato, supra note 2, at 41-42.
8 I realize that the phrase "normative pedagogical commitments" is a mouthful. By a "peda-
gogical commitment" I mean, for example, that if your theory of education conceives of teaching
as primarily the transmission of information from teacher to student, then you are committed
pedagogically to the position, other things being equal, that students do not learn as effectively by
their active participation. This pedagogical commitment in turn entails a "normative" position
that teachers primarily should lecture to their students. All educational theories, including So-
cratic teaching, entail certain normative pedagogical commitments for the teacher.
2003]
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serve as warnings to those of us committed to the method for how it can be im-
properly applied.
Finally, Part IV will assess the proper use of the Socratic method in le-
gal teaching, if any, as well as make recommendations for its future use. This
analysis will suggest that Socratic teaching is only one part, albeit a fundamental
part, of the skill set that we need to teach our students. Part IV will also briefly
address the relationship between the "problems approach" and Socratic teaching
and establish that the methods are in fact complementary. More importantly, the
discussion will conclude that the normative pedagogical commitments for the
teacher and practical consequences for the student of Socratic teaching are wor-
thy of renewed attention and continued application.
II. THE VALUE OF SOCRATIC IGNORANCE
Consider how Socrates might answer the two basic pedagogical ques-
tions with which the essay began - what should we teach our students and how
should we teach it to them. In his famous "cave analogy," Socrates offers a
vision of education:
SOCRATES: And consider this also, said I. If such a one
should go down again and take his old place would he not get
his eyes full of darkness, thus suddenly coming out of the
sunlight?
GLAUCON: He would indeed.
SOCRATES: Now if he should be required to contend with
these perpetual prisoners in "evaluating" these shadows while
his vision was still dim and before his eyes were accustomed to
the dark - and this time required for habituation would not be
very short - would he not provoke laughter, and would it not be
said of him that he had returned from his journey aloft with his
eyes ruined and that it was not worth while even to attempt the
ascent? And if it were possible to lay hands on and to kill the
man who tried to release them and lead them up, would they not
kill him?
GLAUCON: They certainly would, he said.
SOCRATES: But a sensible man, I said, would remember that
there are two distinct disturbances of the eyes arising from two
causes, according as the shift is from light to darkness or from
darkness to light, and, believing that the same thing happens to
[Vol. 105
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the soul too, whenever he saw a soul perturbed and unable to
discern something, he would not laugh unthinkingly ....
GLAUCON: That is a very fair statement, he said.
SOCRATES: Then, if this is true, our view of these matters
must be this, that education is not in reality what some people
proclaim it to be in their professions. What they aver is that
they can put true knowledge into a soul that does not possess it,
as if they were inserting vision into blind eyes.
9
Socrates' theory of education presents a disarmingly simple, albeit puz-
zling, answer to the first question "what should we teach to our students?"'0 His
answer is nothing. According to Socratic educational theory, students already
know what we as teachers are attempting to teach to them; they just do not know
that they know it. This is Socrates' theory that "all inquiry and learning is but
recollection.'' 1 Socrates states:
The soul then, as being immortal, and having been born again
many times, and having seen all things that exist, whether in
this world or in the world below, has knowledge of them all;
and it is no wonder that she [the soul] should be able to call to
remembrance all that she ever knew about virtue and about eve-
rything; for as all nature is akin, and the soul has learned all
things, there is no difficulty in her eliciting, or as men say
"learning," out of a single recollection, all the rest, if a man is
strenuous and does not faint; for all inquiry and all learning is
but recollection.'
2
For Socrates, we cannot teach students something they do not already
know for that is to aver "that [we] can put true knowledge into a soul that does
9 PLATO, THE REPUBLIC (Paul Shorey trans.), reprinted in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF
PLATO 575, 749-50 [516e-518c] (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., 1961). All page
numbers to the dialogues of Plato in this essay shall refer to The Collected Dialogues of Plato. To
enable readers to find the relevant passage in other translations, however, I have provided parallel
parenthetical citations to the standard Stephanus pagination.
10 Throughout this essay I shall speak of Socrates' educational theory and not Plato's educa-
tional theory. Whether the doctrines canvassed herein are actually Plato's, which he later attrib-
uted to Socrates, is a matter of some debate in the literature. See, e.g., G. M. A. GRUBE, PLATO'S
THOUGHT xiii-xiv, 308-09 (1980). Fortunately, this debate has little bearing on the issues dis-
cussed in this essay.
I PLATO, MENO (W.K.C. Guthrie trans.), reprinted in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO,
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not possess it, as if [we] were inserting vision into blind eyes."' 3 What teachers
can do for their students is to get them to recognize explicitly what they already
know implicitly. Rather than transferring information to our students, we
should elicit information from them; information, which in some significant
sense, they already possess.
A. Students Know More Than They Think
If we assume that Socrates' theory of recollection can be relevant to our
approach to teaching, without necessarily committing ourselves to the meta-
physical assumptions of the theory, 14 several interesting normative pedagogical
commitments seem to follow. First and foremost, the Socratic teacher should
approach her students with the attitude that they know more than they think they
know; the effective Socratic teacher should always "strive to treat students and
their ideas with respect"'15 - we must take our students seriously.' 6 If teaching is
viewed as a process of eliciting information from students, information that will
eventually lead to the answers we are looking for, then plainly we must pay
close attention to what our students are saying. This attitudinal approach re-
quires two very simple, but often very difficult, activities on behalf of the
teacher - listening and reinforcing.
First, we have to listen to our students. When our students are respond-
ing to our questions or asking questions of us, we have to listen. One of the
most difficult tasks for the teacher is simply to listen (much less listen carefully)
to what students are saying when class objectives or agendas are in mind. There
is an unexpected benefit from listening to students, however, that makes the
effort worthwhile. We may learn something new, and if we take the effort to
listen closely to our students, our students will be more disposed to take the ef-
fort to listen to us.
Second, if Socratic teaching requires students to supply the information
for class discussion, then in order to keep the information flowing we need to
13 PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 750 [518c].
14 I note in passing that several modem philosophers, most notably Wittgenstein, agree with
Socrates' primary insight that learning can only take place within the situated context of all par-
ticipants, teachers and students, already possessing a great deal of knowledge in common. For
Wittgenstein, it is our common linguistic conventions, our common forms of "life," the prior
possession of which makes inquiry possible. See LUDWIG WITrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL
INVESTIGATIONS, 89 (3d ed., G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 1968).
15 Rosato, supra note 2, at 60.
16 Professor Eisele claims that one of the two main lessons of Socratic teaching is that "you
know more (or other) than what you think (you know)." Thomas D. Eisele, Bitter Knowledge:
Socrates and Teaching by Disillusionment, 45 MERCER L. REv. 587, 603 (1984). The second
lesson of Socratic teaching is that "you don't know what you think you know." Id. This second
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reinforce students' contributions. A simple comment of "good answer" or
"that's right" or "tell me what you think" or "you know this" as the student par-
ticipates in the dialogue, or later incorporating a student's response or question
into the ongoing dialogue with other classmates, not only creates an environ-
ment for renewed contributions from the particular student but also generates
greater participation from students who are listening. If we take Socrates' de-
portment in the Platonic dialogues seriously, we soon see that reinforcement and
support of students is an essential characteristic of Socratic inquiry.' 7 Although
Socrates claims that students already know what they think they do not know, he
also states that getting students to accept that fact - to have confidence in their
dialectical powers - "is strenuous."' 8 To offset that strain, at least somewhat,
reinforcement of students' efforts and contributions is essential. The Socratic
teacher must take the time to reinforce and support students as they attempt to
understand their experiences and the experiences of others in light of relevant
legal doctrine and policy.
B. Students Learn Best by Self-Discovery
Another pedagogical commitment is suggested by Socrates' theory of
recollection: students who actively reconstruct answers for themselves best
achieve learning. Other commentators have stressed the central importance of
students' self-discovery to Socratic teaching. 19 Professor Peter Winch writes:
[W]hen, in Plato's dialogue Meno, Socrates introduced the slave
boy to Pythagoras' Theorem not by telling him the answer to
the problem but by eliciting the answer from him ... [t]he sug-
gestion ... is that each of us has within him or herself the re-
sources for answering the question: a point which Plato ex-
pressed picturesquely in terms of "recollection." The further
suggestion is that ... no one truly has the answer who has not
arrived at it for him or herself. 20
This focus on student self-discovery is illustrated by the Socratic image
of the teacher as a midwife who can allay the pains of giving birth to new ideas
and make "a difficult labor easy."'2' Here, at least, the puzzling theory of recol-
17 See, e.g., PLATO, MENO, supra note 11, at 367 [83c-e].
is See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
19 See, e.g., Rosato, supra note 2, at 43.
20 Peter Winch, Who Is My Neighbour?, in TRYING TO MAKE SENSE 154, 156-57 (1987); see
also Areeda, supra note 4, at 921 ("Why should students care [about the Socratic method]? Be-
cause they learn best by doing. They learn best to reason about the law and facts by doing so.").
21 PLATO, THEAETETuS (F.M. Comford trans.), reprinted in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF
PLATO, supra note 9, at 845, 853-54 [149a-e].
20031
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lection conforms to the insights in modem learning theory, namely, that students
must be actively involved in the learning process in order to learn effectively.22
Thus far the analysis has demonstrated that Socrates' educational theory
is committed pedagogically to the view that students know, in some significant
sense, more than they think they know and that students learn best by actively
participating in the learning process, where the focus is on students generating
their own ideas, and teachers "easing the pain of delivery." In other words,
Socrates' apparently paradoxical theory of recollection has led to what might be
termed a strong "student-centered" theory of education. The next question is
whether Socrates' theory of education is too strongly student-centered.
C. Students Must Internalize the Dialectic
Socrates' educational theory seems to fly in the face of reality. Plainly,
students do not (always) already know what we as teachers are trying to teach
them. Students often get answers wrong. And if they do already know the an-
swers, then why do our students need teachers? Indeed, Socrates sometimes
acts as if there can be no effective teaching, in any meaningful sense of the
word. For instance, in the Meno, Socrates states, "I am not teaching him any-
thing, only asking., 23 But clearly, Socrates does understand the object of the
lesson whereas his student does not. How can we make sense of this apparent
contradiction?
The foregoing analysis has already indicated how Socrates attempts to
solve this problem. According to his theory, even though our students already
know (in some sense) what we as teachers are trying to teach them, they do not
know that they know it. The primary function of teaching, therefore, is to bring
to explicit awareness what is already implicitly known. Professors do this by
using a series of questions and answers called the dialectic. This is not to imply,
however, that Socratic teaching requires the teacher only to ask questions. "The
relentless questioner who never utters a declarative sentence is extinct .... One
need not be so relentless. One can force students to reason for themselves and
still give them some relatively clear and certain knowledge or premises as an-
chors for their independent further exploration. 24
The dialectic is Socrates' term for a special kind of questioning process.
It is a sustained series of questions and answers whereby participants, usually
the teacher and one student, start with a common problem and proceed to ques-
tion their original (starting) perspectives and assumptions on how to solve the
problem. As the dialogue proceeds, the participants formulate new hypotheses
concerning the problem, vary their perspectives, and question their assumptions.
22 See, e.g., David A. Garvin, Barriers and Gateways to Learning, in EDUCATION FOR
JUDGMENT 4-12 (C. Roland Christensen et al. eds., 1991).
23 PLATO, MENO, supra note 11, at 366 [82e].
24 Areeda, supra note 4, at 919.
[Vol. 105
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When necessary, participants also question their moral and political commit-
ments in order to evaluate them against what has gone before in the process.
Most importantly, the participants will honestly admit when their original per-
spectives, assumptions, hypotheses, or values can no longer be maintained (jus-
tified), given what has occurred previously in the process.25 Without such can-
dor, no dialectical progress can be made.
The dialectic has two main objectives. The first objective is to make
some headway in the particular inquiry at hand. Whatever particular matter we
are tackling - analyzing cases, evaluating legal philosophies, interpreting stat-
utes, drafting contracts, negotiating conflicts, etc. - both teacher and student
must be willing to place into question their original perspectives, their assump-
tions, their hypotheses, and the values they assume or wish to examine. In other
words, only if students and teachers are willing to subject their implicit knowl-
edge of the situation to open inquiry can they hope to achieve a better (i.e., more
explicit) understanding of, and justification for, their solution to the problem.
The primary goal of the dialectic, however, is not concerned with the
discovery of better answers to particular problems. Socrates' primary objective
in using the dialectic was to internalize the questioning process in those with
whom he was conversing. For example, at the conclusion of the Meno Socrates
asks Meno to try to work through with his friend Anytus the original problem
that they (Socrates and Meno) failed to solve.26 The clear implication is that
although Socrates and Meno failed to achieve a resolution of the particular prob-
lem before them, the Socratic method achieved its primary goal of creating a
self-learner and self-questioner of Meno. Socrates' primary reason for engaging
others in the dialectic, for returning to the cave, was to provide participants with
a method whereby they can give birth to their own ideas by their own devices.
If the primary goal of Socratic law teaching is to get our students to in-
ternalize the questioning process, this does not mean that our students must in-
ternalize the questions we as teachers place before them (they may do this, but
only if they see why the questions are justified). Instead, we have succeeded in
teaching our students if they become self-questioners, or self-taught, capable of
rendering explicit what they know implicitly by their own devices. Socratic
inquiry succeeds when "[t]he student sees that he could have asked himself
those questions before class; that the kinds of questions the instructor asked can
be self-imposed after class. The internalization of that questioning process is
not an illusion. It is the essence of legal reasoning and the prize of the [Socratic
method]."7
25 This list of tasks is not meant to be exhaustive; after all, even this list, or any other listing
for that matter, is open to question under Socratic inquiry. However, the above list of tasks, ques-
tioning perspectives, assumptions, hypotheses, and values, corresponds fairly closely to Plato's
division of epistemic states in The Republic. See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, supra note 9, at 745-47
[509d-51 le] (the "divided line" of knowledge).
26 See PLATO, MENO, supra note 11, at 384 [1 00b].
27 See Areeda, supra note 4, at 922.
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Socrates' answer to the second question with which this essay began -
how should we teach our students - is now evident. His answer is that we
should ask students questions designed to elicit the knowledge that they already
possess. Additionally, we should aim to get our students to internalize the ques-
tioning process so that they will become self-questioners, and thus self-learners.
In time, if this methodology is successful, then our students will no longer re-
quire us to ask them questions in order for them to learn. Once again, it appears
that the normative pedagogical commitments of Socratic teaching, at least as
Socrates understood this method, are heavily student-centered.
There is an important objection that must be met at this point in the dis-
cussion. If the primary goal of Socratic teaching is to have our students inter-
nalize the questioning process, does this not imply that teachers already have
internalized the process? And further, this apparently implies that teachers al-
ready possess the correct answers to their questions. In other words, how can
teachers get someone else to "re-collect" his knowledge unless the teachers have
already recollected their own knowledge? Accordingly, the argument goes,
Socratic teaching is at bottom a sham. It is a process in which teachers only
feign ignorance while exposing their students' ignorance.28
Does Socratic teaching require teachers to feign ignorance? It is true
that most teachers have dealt with the class materials previously. 29 They have
mastered the process of asking tough questions concerning those materials and
they are cognizant of alternative interpretations, of different arguments and legal
perspectives in the literature that might be posited. They also know the standard
interpretations of the class materials and prepare their questions with the expec-
tation that the standard answers will be, and should be, covered in class. The
teacher brings all this preparation, and much more, to the dialogue with stu-
dents. Here, at least, the teacher does feign ignorance about what answers she
has arrived at, if by "feigning" one means continuing to ask questions so stu-
dents arrive at the standard answers through self-discovery. But even here, the
teacher does not know how students will in fact answer the questions posed, or
what questions students will bring to the dialogue.
In another important sense, however, the answer to the above question
must be no. Socratic teaching does not require teachers to "feign" their igno-
rance because even their ignorance is genuine. The "standard" answer is itself
subject to further questioning and, according to Socratic inquiry, its status as a
standard is always provisional. This crucial insight leads to the final pedagogical
commitment of Socratic teaching - the teacher must also enter into the dialogue
as a full participant. Because teachers have undergone the process before, per-
haps many, many times, they can serve as guides, but they should never claim
28 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
29 Indeed, no one (seriously) argues that Socrates was not familiar with Pythagoras' Theorem.
[Vol. 105
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final authority if they take seriously the value of Socratic ignorance. The dia-
logue may elicit something new from teacher and students.3 °
D. Professors Know Less Than They Think
What can it mean to the Socratic teacher to claim that the aspirational
value of Socratic teaching is ignorance, or a unique type of ignorance, even if
we attempt to stave off this paradox by invoking the hallowed name of
Socrates? To answer this question, an obscure (and often overlooked) passage
in the Meno offers insight. Socrates recounts a tale of a traveler who must
choose the correct road to town without knowing it. If the traveler guesses cor-
rectly, Socrates claims that the guess is just as good a guide for the traveler's
actions as if he knew the correct way - a surprising admission from an alleged
rationalist.3 ' Of course, the traveler might guess incorrectly. How can we be
sure if our guesses are good guesses, correct guesses, if we all start from mere
hunches? The short answer is that we cannot be sure. Instead, Socrates sug-
gests that by exposing our hunches to questioning we might be able to "tie them
down," and once tied down they are termed knowledge.3 It seems that hunches
are the stuff of which knowledge is made - another surprising admission. 33
Nonetheless, a new question can always be asked, and if interesting, it
can open a whole new line of questioning. And why do we find a question in-
teresting? At best, we have another hunch. It seems that we must constantly be
relying on, while simultaneously tying down, our hunches if we are ever to
claim that we know anything. This is why Socrates concludes the passage, and
most other Platonic dialogues, by stating that there are few things he claims to
know. 34 He "knows" that he does not know. However, the one thing he does
claim to know is the value of the questioning process itself - though open-
ended, it is the only way we learn, and if knowledge is ever achieved, it is the
only way we achieve it.35 The paradox is that all our knowledge is always open
to question and questioning our knowledge is what creates more knowledge.
The questioning process simultaneously "ties down" and "unties" what we claim
to know. Realizing the dual functions of the dialogue, and realizing that all of
our epistemic claims, teacher's and student's alike, should be subject to ongoing
30 In the words of Rabbi Hanina, "I have learned much from my teachers, and from my col-
leagues I have learned much more than from my teachers; but from my students I have learned
more than from all of them." 13 THE TALMUD: THE STEINsALTz EDITION 82 (1995).
31 PLATO, MENO, supra note 11, at 381 [97b-c].
32 Id. at 381-82 [97e-98a].
33 Cf JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 143-47 (1930) (arguing that the vital
motivating impulse for a judicial decision is the hunch - an intuitive sense of what is right or
wrong in the particular case).
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questioning, is to achieve a gain in self-knowledge (paradoxically). As Profes-
sor Eisele aptly observes, "The point of Socratic questioning is simply to show
not where we all differ but rather where we all are the same: we all share the
condition of, on occasion, not knowing what we claim to know." 36 Socrates
thought this awareness was the first step towards wisdom; it is the state of So-
cratic ignorance.37
What follows for the Socratic teacher and what are the practical conse-
quences for the classroom if we assume as an aspirational pedagogical value the
state of Socratic ignorance? First and foremost, for the Socratic teacher it means
that the dialogues in classes cannot be limited to questioning only students'
"hunches" about the law. If the teacher is going to engage in a Socratic dia-
logue, the teacher's hunches, perspectives, assumptions, presuppositions, and
values must also be put into question. The Socratic teacher must constantly be
open to exposing and changing her perspective, reevaluating her assumptions,
questioning her policy analyses in light of what students answer and ask.38
Yes, it also follows that students should ask questions in the Socratic
classroom; it is a dialogue after all. Needless to say, if it is the fundamental goal
of Socratic teaching to get our students to internalize the questioning process,
then students, if we as teachers are successful, are going to ask questions and
pose hypotheticals of the teacher. In the Socratic classroom, students as well as
the teacher should lead the dialogue by asking questions, and the hunches of
both the teacher and students must be exposed to the questioning process.
Third, when students do question the teacher's "hunches" about the law
in the class, the teacher must be willing to hold our "answers" up to the public
light without lashing out at the questioner. When teachers are successful at
varying their perspectives, assumptions, and evaluations in the light of student
questions, the students soon learn that the dialogue really can be a collaborative
process. At its best, Socratic teaching really does uncover shared questions that
neither the teacher or the students were aware of prior to the dialogue.
39
This brief glimpse of Socrates' educational theory has uncovered sev-
eral important normative pedagogical commitments and several practical class-
room techniques. First, students know more than they think they know. Ac-
cordingly, the Socratic teacher must take students and their ideas seriously, care-
36 Eisele, supra note 16, at 614.
37 See PLATO, SOPHIST (F.M. Cornford trans.), reprinted in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF
PLATO, supra note 9, at 957, 972 [230a].
38 See id. (Socrates states that "no one who thinks himself wise is willing to learn any of those
things in which he is conscious of his own cleverness."); cf Eisele, supra note 16, at 617 (The
Socratic teacher always must be "open to the possibility that the teacher - and not the student - is
wrong in this instance.").
39 Professor Rosato terms this type of dialogue the "true" Socratic method, but she questions
its practical application in large first-year classes. See Rosato, supra note 2, at 41-43. I would
like to believe that for most teachers committed to Socratic teaching the "true" Socratic method
remains, at the very least, an aspirational goal.
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fully listening to students' answers and questions, and reinforcing students as
they attempt to make sense out of their experiences with the law. Second, stu-
dents learn best by actively participating in class via a process of self-discovery.
Again, the Socratic teacher must "ease the delivery" of students' contributions,
since their contributions are what fuel the dialogue. Third, the goal of education
is to have students internalize the questioning process and thereby become self-
questioners and self-learners. If the method is successful, students will assume
the role of inquirer, both of their classmates and the teacher. Fourth, the teacher
must also enter the dialogue as a full participant, ready to vary her perspectives,
question her assumptions, create new hypotheses, and address competing, and
often marginalized, values. This follows from the aspirational value of Socratic
ignorance: the recognition that teachers and students alike often do not know
what they think they know.
As noted earlier, this part of the essay was primarily addressed to teach-
ers committed to Socratic teaching. The insights drawn from this brief glimpse
at Socrates' theory of recollection are to serve as guides for the proper approach
to and application of the method. The secondary purpose was to present in stark
contrast the popular image of the overbearing, brow-beating professor who
claims to use the Socratic method with an image of a teacher derived from the
internal pedagogical commitments of the method itself. Hopefully, readers can
now see that the Professor Kingsfields of the academy misapply the method.
Nevertheless, if modem Socratic teachers deviate too greatly from the
internal pedagogical commitments of the theory, then the criticisms concerning
the overbearing "Socratic" professor would be, and sometimes are, justified. If
modern Socratic law teaching claims that its pedigree derives from Socrates,
then it must also adhere closely to the pedagogical commitments developed by
its namesake. It is a cautionary tale; our students' legal careers are at stake. The
potential for great good contained in the proper application of the method is
accompanied by the potential for great harm if misapplied.
III. ONCE MORE INTO THE CAVE: ADDRESSING THE CRITICISMS
The most salient criticisms in the literature target the alleged deleterious
effects on students of current Socratic law teaching. Do these criticisms apply
to the type of Socratic law teaching developed in Part II? This Part will demon-
strate that the four main criticisms raised against the current Socratic method do
not directly apply against the method developed in Part II, or where they do
indirectly apply, there are significant gains to students that more than offset the
potential risks. Nevertheless, this part will also demonstrate that the concerns of
critical scholars serve as guideposts or warnings to avoid improperly applying
the method-because the simple fact is that proper Socratic teaching is difficult.
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A. The Humiliation of Students
Perhaps the most troubling criticism raised against current Socratic law
teaching is that it humiliates students. 40 This criticism is so troubling because if
true it would undermine one of the primary goals, if not the main goal, of the
method discussed in this essay. Plainly, Socratic teachers cannot secure the
internalization of the questioning process if students are being humiliated in the
process. It is also clear that Socratic teaching, properly understood, does require
students to be honest and candid in their assessment of their own perspectives,
assumptions, experiences, and values. When students are required to speak in
class on a particular matter often it will be their personal opinion that will be
discussed and possibly found to be wanting. Additionally, as Professor Areeda
notes, "[flor many students, the law school classroom is their first exposure to
public speaking and argument, which will be scrutinized by their classmates and
the instructor. '4 1 All this can be fairly intimidating, and possibly unintentionally
humiliating, for some students. Any teacher properly using the Socratic method
must take heed.42
Given the possible unintentional intimidation and humiliation of some
students, the reasons for still using Socratic teaching, as developed in Part II, are
twofold. First, although we do test students on their ability to identify the stan-
dard legal doctrines and policies in the particular areas of the law we are teach-
ing, we also test students on their ability to arrive at those answers. We test
them on their ability to analyze how the doctrinal analysis has been applied in
the past, how it might be applied in the future, and how the application or doc-
trinal construct itself might change given a corresponding change in fact pattern
or background assumptions. These doctrinal analytical skills, which form the
foundation of more sophisticated legal thinking, are modeled, learned, and rein-
forced in the Socratic dialogues of the classroom.
Second, more than any other pedagogy, the Socratic method closely
models fundamental skills required by current legal practice. The current prac-
tice of law, for better or worse, often entails publicly addressing on and respond-
ing to difficult questions where the speaker's reasoning must withstand close
scrutiny. Before the court, in the boardroom, before the senior partner, or en-
gaging clients, difficult questions will be asked of our students, often in a (pain-
fully) public forum. In order to prepare our students for the rigors of current
40 See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
41 Areeda, supra note 4, at 917.
42 See, e.g., Alan A. Stone, Legal Education on the Couch, 85 HARV. L. REV. 392, 415 (1971)
(noting that "the professor's capacity to criticize within the Socratic method [often] exceeds his
[ability to use it]"); Eisele, supra note 16, at 601 n.l 1 ("On several occasions, I have received
comments on student evaluation forms that my continual interruptions of my students are an irri-
tating habit of mine (distracting, and impolite as well). This may be an inevitable cost of what I
see as the benefits of such a teaching technique - but I do not want to deny that this reaction
means that I have to continually rethink both the efficacy and the ethics of this way of teaching.").
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legal practice, we must prepare them for public speaking in difficult situations,
often with minimal information and preparation, and with large interests at
stake. Our students must be able to address the problems presented, analyze
applicable legal doctrine, evaluate the underlying concerns and commitments of
those affected, effectively respond to the questions asked, and ask the right
questions in turn, all the while thinking on their feet. Socratic teaching uniquely
prepares students for such important legal tasks.
Socratic teaching should never humiliate or intimidate students if prop-
erly applied, but obviously, what one person perceives as an enlightening ex-
perience, another might perceive as humiliating. To the extent that the proper
application of Socratic teaching unintentionally intimidates or humiliates a stu-
dent, the cautious response is that Socratic teaching more than any other avail-
able pedagogy closely models and prepares students for the rigors of "the intel-
lectual exchange" that repeatedly occurs in current legal practice. The Socratic
method also internalizes in students the analytical and doctrinal problem solving
skills that they will be tested on and use in developing more sophisticated legal
reasoning.
The unintentional act, however, does not necessarily imply that Socratic
teaching entails the intentional humiliation of students. Some critics of the tra-
ditional method apparently make this further inference. For example, Professors
Thomas Shaffer and Robert Redmount write:
Any adequate teaching method requires trust. In law school,
though, trust may turn to consternation when the professor then
teasingly (and, in the traditional model, sadistically) exploits the
student's thinking to demonstrate that the student is not only ig-
norant but incompetent. It is, then, as if the professor is saying
to the student: "You see, you really don't know how to do it.
You cannot even think straight. But, still, if you will listen and
follow me carefully, you may catch on somehow." 4
As previously shown, nothing could be further from the pedagogical commit-
ments entailed by Socratic inquiry. The above example is little more than an
example of ridicule. Ridicule presupposes that the targeted student is somehow
different from or inferior to the rest of the class and the teacher. To the con-
trary, Socratic teaching commits us to the view that we all, teachers and students
alike, are subject to self-ignorance; we all make mistakes - we all do not always
know what we think we know. Socrates would admonish that "a sensible man,.
43 See Rosato, supra note 2, at 44 ("Socratic dialogue models the same kind of intellectual
exchange that occurs in the practice of law.., most lawyers are regularly 'called on' to articulate
arguments to an inquisitive, incredulous audience - be it client, a senior partner or a judge.").
44 SHAFFER & REDMOUNT, supra note 4, at 158.
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•. whenever he saw a soul perturbed and unable to discern something, he would
not laugh unthinkingly. 45
To believe that Socratic teaching countenances such abuse of students is
to ignore that at the heart of Socratic teaching is the commitment by the teacher
to the attitude that students know more than they think they know. The criticism
also downplays the fact that the teacher too is personally exposing her beliefs in
the process. Socratic teaching is a reciprocal process, a dialogue (not a mono-
logue), between the teacher and student, and between student and student. Nev-
ertheless, no one likes to be proven wrong. Accordingly, students "need to be
told and reminded that error is inevitable,' 46 and that error is inevitable in both
teachers and students.
This particular line of criticism demonstrates that some critics of the
traditional Socratic method are often carried away in their analysis by a concep-
tion of the overbearing law professor. Such a teacher is not truly Socratic. Be-
cause this particular line of criticism fundamentally misconstrues Socratic teach-
ing, "this objection is to misuse the method., 47
B. "Hiding the Ball" From Students
Another line of criticism often urged against Socratic teaching is that it
is an inefficient48 and unfair way to communicate information that the teacher
possesses but does not reveal. The teacher either unfairly "hides the ball' 49
from students by feigning ignorance or, if information is given to students, the
teacher insists that the information is inadequate. Professors Shaffer and Red-
mount term this criticism "the riddle of ineffective information., 50 They assert
that "[t]he professor possesses, and will provide (in his own way) essential in-
formation, but he never tells all he knows and what he does tell will not suffice
to provide the commodities the student wants.",5' These authors go on to explain
that the "commodities" that students want is "to learn the law.",52 This same
criticism is voiced by Professor Nancy Schultz when she argues that "if one has
something important to tell, and takes one's teaching seriously, there is no
45 PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, supra note 9, 749-50 [517a-518c].
46 Areeda, supra note 4, at 917.
47 Id. at 916.
48 See, e.g., Weaver, supra note 3, at 547; A. HARNO, LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED
STATES 63 (1953) (voicing the concern that the Socratic method is an inefficient and extremely
time consuming way to impart information).
49 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
50 See SHAFFER & REDMOUNT, supra note 4, at 154.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 156.
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power that can interfere - unless the teacher chooses to become artificial, 'So-
cratic,' deviously 'permissive,' ultimately withholding. 53
In the face of these criticisms should Socratic teachers simply tell stu-
dents what they know? The answer must be no, primarily because the law, and
our understanding of the law, is not a fungible "commodity. 54 Only by assum-
ing, as these critics do, that the law is a "commodity," with a determinate body
of given content, will law teaching entail little more than spoon-feeding that
commodity to law students. Based on this assumption, the appropriate model of
legal education apparently is the transmission of the teacher's "answers." To
withhold the teacher's answers under this model is disingenuous.
Perhaps most incoming first-year law students view the nature of the
law in this way and this might explain their initial frustration with Socratic
teaching, which does withhold the teacher's "answers" from them.55  Who
wouldn't want to be given the "correct" answers? The problem with this line of
criticism is that the assumption that the law is largely determinate with given
content and settled boundaries (i.e., law as a "commodity"), is seriously under-
inclusive, if not outright wrong. In fact, most legal principles are fundamentally
unsettled with, as yet, no determinate boundary conditions or answers.56 Rather
than withholding the "correct" answers from students, Socratic questioning in
fact arms students with skills for gaining or creating solutions in unsettled areas
of the law. If we are trying to make our students better lawyers (capable of find-
ing new solutions to unsettled legal principles), and if our students learn best by
discovering those answers for themselves, then we must teach them how to
solve legal problems on their own. Socratic teaching is uniquely suited to this
53 See Nancy Schultz, How Do Lawyers Really Think?, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 57, 87-88 (1992);
see also Coleburn & Spring, supra note 4, at 26 ("The Socratic method induces students not to
know what they thought they knew - and before a jury of their peers - while the professor can
choose to reveal whether or not she knows.").
54 See THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1-2 (R. Dworkin ed., 1977).
55 See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
56 It is one of the ironies of legal history that these same scholars rail (rightly, I think) against
using the Langdellian case method in law school classes while uncritically accepting (wrongly, I
think) a conception of the law with precisely defined contours, which is a vestige of Langdell's
notion of the law as a science. See, e.g., C.C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS vi (1871). Even Oliver Wendell Holmes, an early admirer of Langdell's case method,
would later reject Langdell's formalistic conception of the law stating "[t]he truth is, that the law
is always approaching and never reaching, consistency .... It will become entirely consistent only
when it ceases to grow." OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 36 (Dover 1991) (1881); see
also Paul D. Carrington, The Romance of American Law: Making A Public Profession, 1779-
1979, at 3-4 (July 10, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) ("In the same way that
a detailed knowledge of the river is insufficient to make a good pilot, a detailed knowledge of
statutes and legal decisions is insufficient to make a good lawyer; knowledge must be accompa-
nied by judgment. The medium of lawyers is, of course, words not water, and the forces that
influence their meanings are social and political, not natural. Even less than the river is law sub-
ject to precise measurements and certain predictions. Law is a craft, or perhaps an art or even a
faith, but seldom in any useful sense a science.").
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task. Seen in this light, spoon-feeding settled legal content to our students per-
forms a disservice. It presents students with an erroneous conception of the law
while at the same time denying them the tools to create answers or solutions out
of unsettled legal principles.
C. Creating the "Combative" Student
An additional complaint raised in the literature concerning traditional
Socratic teaching is not that it does not work but, rather, that it works too well in
producing unnecessarily combative and competitive students. Critics assert that
Socratic teaching produces students who "analyze and dissect everything that
someone says ... not so much to find the truth, but just for the sake of arguing
and pointing out frailties. 57 This line of criticism claims that Socratic teaching
devolves into little more than "a hunt for the right answer ... [and] talk of col-
laboration and compromise is dismissed as sour grapes.' 58
These scholars do not seem to be making the claim that competition,
without more, is harmful to our students. Fair competition does not inevitably
lead to abusive behavior and it can (sometimes) determine relative merit. At the
end of each semester, we grade student papers and exams, hopefully fairly, in
competition with each other. The real concern with asking our students to com-
pete against one another is to ensure the competition is fair, not to do away with
the competition.
Rather, these scholars seem to be claiming that traditional Socratic
teaching creates an unnecessarily virulent form of competition in our students, a
form of competition that precludes meaningful collaborative behavior and en-
genders abusive behavior in our students. Neither conclusion, of course, follows
from the proper use of the Socratic method described in Part II. First, when a
particular class matter is open to Socratic inquiry, often, if not always, the most
plausible answer will be a compromise solution gleaned from the various stu-
dent opinions, perspectives, or arguments proffered around the room. There is
no intrinsic reason why students utilizing Socratic inquiry cannot collaborate
with one another - they often do collaborate with another - in developing the
compromise answer that the class finds most adequate.
Perhaps these scholars merely assume that Socratic teaching cannot be
usefully combined with more collaborative teaching styles such as the "prob-
lems approach." To the contrary, the collaborative "problems approach," for
example, and Socratic teaching are in fact complementary methods. Under the
"problems approach," student groups are first given assignments before class to
work on together. Then, when the groups report their findings, solutions, and
comments in class to the general class, the Socratic dialogue continues as usual
between teacher and group(s), and between the groups themselves. Addition-
57 See, e.g., SHAFFER & REDMOUNT, supra note 4, at 160-61.
58 See, e.g., Coleburn & Spring, supra note 4, at 26.
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ally, our understanding of Socratic teaching discloses the collaborative effort
between the teacher and students, and between the students themselves. At its
best, Socratic teaching really does uncover shared questions that neither the
teacher nor the students were aware of prior to the dialogue.59
Second, arguing for the sake of attacking others is no different from
misusing the Socratic method to ridicule others. 6°  It bears repeating that
Socratic teaching should demonstrate that we all are alike in our quest for
knowledge: we all, on occasion, know more than we think we know and do not
know all that we think we know.6 ' Here, again, these scholars improperly iden-
tify the difficulties that result from a misuse of the Socratic method - difficulties
that would also surface with the improper application of any teaching pedagogy
- with the method as properly applied.
D. The "Silencing" of Women and Minorities
Finally, there is a related and extremely influential line of criticism
charging that traditional Socratic teaching is effectively opposed to the
achievement of the indisputably important educational goal of diversity. The
claim is that current Socratic teaching hinders the educational opportunities of
women and minorities, being particularly deleterious to African American
women. Originally utilizing the heralded work of Carol Gilligan,62 these
scholars claim that the way women think is different from the way men think,
and that women's communal, collaborative, and moral thinking is ignored, dis-
couraged, and silenced by Socratic teaching that reinforces the independent,
isolated analytical thinking of white men.63 If we continue to utilize Socratic
teaching, the argument goes, women and non-whites will be marginalized in the
classroom, which will eventually lead to their marginalization in the legal pro-
fession. This argument is all the more troublesome because continued efforts at
achieving diversity have at long last resulted in women composing roughly half
of entering law school classes.64
In the late 1980s and early 1990s several individual law school studies
uniformly indicated women's experience of law school was markedly different
from that of their male classmates. 65 Although women performed approxi-
59 See supra Part II.D.
60 See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
61 See supra Parts II.A., D.
62 See, e.g., CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S
DEVELOPMENT (1982).
63 See, e.g., Ohio Study, supra note 5, at 314; Pennsylvania Study, supra note 5, at 61-68;
Berkeley Study, supra note 5, at 18, 28-29; Yale Study, supra note 5, at Pts. IV & V; and ABA
Study, supra note 5, at 15-17.
64 See ABA Study, supra note 5, at 23.
65 See, e.g., supra notes 5 and 63 for individual law school studies.
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mately as well as men, women did not perform as well as their prior under-
graduate performance indicated. Additionally, the results of the studies indi-
cated that women felt less accomplished and confident in their skills after com-
pleting law school, and much narrative evidence suggested that Socratic teach-
ing played a role in women's unfavorable experience of law school. 66 The prob-
lem with these studies is that they reported on fairly small samples of students,
making it difficult to base general conclusions on the data.67 Additionally, the
original starting assumption of some of the studies that all women, minorities, or
ethnic groups think alike or monolithically came under attack.68 Further, the
studies did not quantitatively link Socratic teaching to the lower than expected
performance of women or minorities but instead primarily relied on narrative
evidence. Nevertheless, the reported narrative evidence was overwhelmingly
negative concerning the traditional use of the Socratic method. 69
In 1996 the Law School Admission Council ("LSAC") reported on a
study of women in law school, examining entrance qualifications of approxi-
mately 28,000 students from 152 law schools, and analyzing questionnaires
completed prior to entrance and after completion of the first year of law school
from approximately 7,000 students.70 The LSAC study found that, consistent
with the earlier individual school studies, although women perform approxi-
mately as well as men in their first year of law school, women's entering quali-
fications are higher and therefore women were expected to perform slightly bet-
ter than men.71 Significantly, the LSAC study found that while women's aca-
demic self-concept was lower than men's after the first year of law school,
women enter law school with a significantly lower academic self-concept.72
Accordingly, the decline in academic self-concept was approximately the same
for men and women, although unfortunately, women start law school with a
66 See, e.g., Ohio Study, supra note 5, at 314; Pennsylvania Study, supra note 5, at 61-68;
Berkeley Study, supra note 5, at 18, 28-29; Yale Study, supra note 5, at Pts. IV-V.
67 For example, the Yale Study consisted of 20 students, the Stanford Study consisted of 343
students, the Berkeley Study consisted of 667 students, the Ohio Study consisted of 800 students.
Ohio Bar Ass'n, Final Report: Ohio Joint Task Force on Gender Fairness 35-40 (1995).
68 See, e.g., Angela Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv.
581 (1990).
69 See supra notes 63 & 66 and accompanying text.
70 Linda Whiteman, Women in Legal Education: A Comparison of the Law School Perform-
ance and Law School Experiences of Women and Men 5-7 (1996) (published by the Law School
Admission Council).
71 Id. at 26-27.
72 Id. at 72-74. The study operationally defines the notion of "academic self-concept" as how
students rate themselves in comparison with their classmates, on a scale of 1 (lowest) to 5 (high-
est), in academic ability, competitiveness, public speaking ability, self-confidence in academic
situations, and writing ability. Id. at 53-55.
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lower academic self-concept than men.73 The study indicated that higher debt,
lower socio-economic status, greater external family commitments, the lack of
role models within the law school and legal community, and persistent experi-
ences of sexual and racial discrimination from some fellow students and some
faculty members were factors that positively correlated with those women who
performed worse than expected, particularly African American women.74 Most
important for present purposes, the study found that there was no correlation
between the number of Socratic classes taken by women who performed worse
than expected.75 The study concluded:
There are no significant differences between [women who per-
formed better than expected and women who performed worse
than expected] in the proportion of their first-year classes that
used different teaching methods. These data were examined to
determine whether those women who performed worse might
have been exposed to a disproportionate number of classes that
employed the Socratic method. The data did not support that
76hypothesis.
Where does this leave us? Although the literature expresses an over-
whelming negative attitude towards traditional Socratic teaching, the "hard"
data on precisely how Socratic teaching affects women, ethnic groups, and mi-
norities is sketchy and conflicting. The most comprehensive study to date of
women in law school indicates that socio-economic and cultural factors, rather
than the particular teaching pedagogy encountered in law school, are causally
linked to the lower than expected performance of women in law schools, par-
ticularly African American women.77 Until more evidence is available, it is
premature to conclude that traditional Socratic teaching, much less the type of
Socratic teaching derived from the internal pedagogical constraints of Socrates'
educational theory, is responsible for the different experience of or performance
in law school by women and minorities.
Having briefly canvassed the four main lines of criticism against the
traditional use of Socratic method in law schools, the conclusion is that their
73 Id.
74 Id. at I I 1- 14.
75 Id. at 113.
76 Id.
77 Cf. Rosato, supra note 2, at 49 ("At the outset, it is important to distinguish the negative
effects on women purportedly caused by the Socratic Method itself and those caused by other
factors such as the adversarial nature of the adjudicatory system, the inappropriate conduct of
professors and fellow students and the lack of support for women in law school community. In
my view, the disparate impact of legal education on women students is primarily attributable to
these factors and not the Socratic Method.").
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critical sting does not directly apply to Socratic teaching properly employed.
Specifically, Socratic teaching does not entail the intentional humiliation of stu-
dents. Some critical scholars too often assume that professors must harass stu-
dents with questions calculated to reduce them to tears in order to perform the
Socratic method properly.78 Moreover, the discussion indicated that the proper
use of Socratic teaching does not prevent students from cooperating with one
another or from asking questions of the teacher, and, when information is with-
held from students, it is withheld for good reason. The teacher's answers are
withheld from students because students learn best by creating their own an-
swers; students learn best by doing. Finally, the discussion canvassed the data
marshaled to support the claim that traditional Socratic teaching disadvantages
women and minorities. This data indicated that societal factors outside of law
school as well as the lack of role models and support mechanisms within law
school are probably the primary factors for women's, particularly minority
women's, lower than expected performance in law school. As for the particular
strengths to be gained through the proper use of Socratic teaching, the method
closely models the intellectual exchanges that predominate current legal prac-
tice, with special emphasis being placed on improving students' public speaking
and analytical skills when the students are placed before an inquisitive, incredu-
lous audience.
Nevertheless, those of us who are committed to the proper use of So-
cratic teaching must candidly admit that the successful classroom dialogue is
often more an aspirational goal than a factual accomplishment. Without ques-
tion, the proper use of Socratic teaching takes its toll on the teacher; it is a diffi-
cult teaching technique to apply properly. The long preparation time, framing
just the right questions, carefully responding to student answers and questions,
and collaborating with the participant(s) of the dialogue and the general class in
achieving a better understanding of the particular legal problem, all point to
potential areas where the method can go wrong. It stands to reason that if the
method takes its toll on teachers, the method can also take its toll on students.
Socratic teachers can profit from a deeper understanding of the critical literature
because it serves as an important checking function against the possible ex-
cesses of the method. In particular, teachers who wish to use Socratic inquiry
must heed the warning that students are often intimidated by the method. Addi-
tionally, the consistent negative narrative evidence of women, particularly Afri-
can American women, against Socratic teaching must commit us to ensuring
that women, particularly African American women, become full participants in
the dialogues in our classes. The combined strength of these criticisms of tradi-
tional Socratic teaching should lead those of us who are committed to the proper
use of Socratic teaching to redouble our efforts to abide by the internal con-
straints of the method.
78 See, e.g., SHAFFER & REDMOUNT, supra note 4, at 158.
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IV. FROM DARKNESS To LIGHT
This essay has attempted to take a fresh look at Socratic law teaching.
Mindful of the critical legal scholarship against a type of Socratic teaching al-
leged to be in current use in the legal academy, Part H returned to the method's
source and developed the internal pedagogical commitments of the method.
Part III then applied the most salient criticisms in literature to the newly uncov-
ered Socratic pedagogy and discovered that this method is not directly subject to
their critical sting.
Nonetheless, even if it has been demonstrated that the proper use of So-
cratic teaching should continue to be a central component of law school teach-
ing, one should not claim that Socratic teaching is the only teaching technique or
the only skill set we need to teach our students. For example, Part 1II suggested
that the tendency in the literature to identify Socratic teaching with the case
method and not with a problems approach is misguided. 79 By combining So-
cratic teaching with a problems approach, we can increase the collaborative ef-
forts of our students. When the groups report their findings, analyses, and
comments to the general class, Socratic questioning between teacher and
group(s), or between the groups themselves, can be usefully employed to elicit
what the students have worked on previously outside of class.8 Additionally,
role playing, where students might assume the persona of judge, jury, or litigant,
or where the student participant of a particular dialogue becomes the "expert" on
that legal problem for further class discussions, can be used to great effect in
Socratic teaching.
Socratic teaching also does not provide students with all of the skills
necessary for their legal careers. A quick read of the MacCrate Report will in-
dicate that the oratory and analytical problem solving skills involved in Socratic
law teaching comprise only a small, though important, subset of the skills
needed by lawyers in various settings.81 For instance, clinical and writing skills
play little to no part in traditional Socratic teaching.82 At best, Socratic question-
79 See, e.g., Richard Neumann, Jr., A Preliminary Inquiry into the Art of Critique, 40
HASTINGs L.J. 725, 740 (1989) (properly distinguishing Langdellian case method from Socratic
teaching); see also supra note 56.
80 See, e.g., Myron Moskovitz, Beyond the Case Method: It's Time to Teach With Problems,
42 J. LEGAL. EDUC. 241, 254-56 (1992) (describing a sample Socratic dialogue using the problems
approach).
81 See MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at 138-41.
82 Jerome Frank was the first to bemoan the lack of clinical skills (i.e., teaching law students
the complex interaction skills between client and practitioner, practitioner and court, what "law-
yers actually do") in the Socratic method. See, e.g., Jerome Frank, Both Ends Against the Middle,
100 U. PA. L. REv. 907, 913-21 (1951); Jerome Frank, Why NotA Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U.
PA. L. REv. 907, 913-21 (1933). Notable legal scholars soon followed Frank's lead. See, e.g.,
Karl Llewellyn, The Current Crisis in Legal Education, 1 J. LEGAL EDUC. 211, 216 (1948); see
also Weaver, supra note 3, at 546-47 n.85.
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ing provides our students with some of the "effective techniques of learning
from experience. 83
Socratic teaching develops the fundamental analytic and doctrinal prob-
lem solving skills required for development of more sophisticated legal reason-
ing.84 Accordingly, students should encounter the method in their first-year law
classes. As our students proceed in their law school careers, having internal-
ized the questioning process, a more open forum of general discussion and prob-
lem solving can be substituted as the predominant pedagogy for upper-level law
classes.
Perhaps no single teaching method is most effective for teaching the
law.85 This essay has presented the case for reconsidering Socratic teaching as
one of the methods most effective for teaching the law. The primary goal of
Socratic law teaching is to empower law students to think for themselves. The
method seeks to avoid what Socrates termed the worst kind of ignorance, "the
ignorance which deprives one of mastery over himself., 86 Current critical
legal scholarship notwithstanding, Socratic teaching when properly applied does
accomplish its goal, and the goal is worthy of our renewed interest and contin-
ued commitment.
83 Cf Anthony G. Amsterdam, Clinical Legal Education - A 21st Century Perspective, 34 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 612, 616 (1984).
84 See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
85 See Schultz, supra note 53, at 71-72 (noting that attempts to measure the effectiveness of
the case method, problem method, lecture, programmed instruction, and audiovisual methods did
not disclose significant differences).
86 PLATO, PROTAGORAS (Paul Shorey trans.), reprinted in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF
PLATO, supra note 9, at 308, 346 [354D].
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